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Case No.

12832

BRIEF 0 F RESPONDENTS
1

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the equitable decision of the
lower court, directed to the conscience of the court, denying
plaintiff-appellant's complaint for injunctive relief.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff's complaint for injunctive relief, enjoining the
Road Commission of the State of Utah as a governmental
entity and as individuals, together with W eyher Construction
1

Company, the State's contractor, from construction of the
North Temple Viaduct in Salt Lake City, was dismissed upon
the motion of defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek a ruling of this Court, sustaining
the judgment of the lower court as being within its sound
discretion and in accordance with law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents accept as substantially correct the Statement
of Facts as it appears in appellant's brief, except for the few
matters hereinafter stated by way of amendment or clarification.
At hearing on plaintiff-appellant's Order to Show Cause
on November 16, 1971, the State and the individually-named
defendants stipulated that if this Court, after reviewing the
authorities cited by the respective parties and conducting any
further hearing it deemed advisable, were to rule that if in·
formed at the time of the hearing as fully as after the complete review it would have issued an injunction, then the
parties would treat the case as though injunction had issued
for purposes of further proceeding and not claim advantage
by reason of delay. It was not supposed that the defendants
would waive their respective rights of appeal to this Court
on the question of the injunction (R. 155-156). The stipula·
tion as interpreted by the court ( R. 15 3-15 4) was that in·
tended by the defendants. At the time of the Order to Show
Cause hearing, the parties agreed that neither would claim
advantage while the Court reviewed the authorities and that
2

the bid-letting and construction should, therefore, get under
way immediately without legal or equitable hindrance ( R.
154).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
DAMAGES, IF ANY, SUFFERED BY THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WERE NON-COMPENSABLE AS THE REASONABLE EXEROSE
OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE (damnum absgue injuria).
It is well established in the law of this State and throughout the several jurisdictions that not all damages resulting
from highway improvements are compensable. (Springville
Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, 349 P.2d 157; Utah
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U.2d 305, 383 P.2d 917;
State v. Parker, 13 U.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585; Rayburn v. State
of Arizona,_378 P.2d 496; State v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d, 855).
This is particularly so where, as in this case, the highway improvement is built completely within the State's right of way.
No real estate was taken from the appellant and the evidence
adduced by it on hearing before the lower court dearly established that reasonable access to North Temple Street from
appellant's property was planned. ( R. 143 ) . Such reasonable
access has in fact been provided.
Although appellant is incorrect when it asserts that the
State stipulated that appellant had in fact suffered damage
(R. 148) , for purposes of hearing before the lower court,
the State did agree that appellant may be able to produce
admissible evidence that it had so suffered. The real issue of

3

law upon which this case was disposed of in the court below,
and which we respectfully suggest is equally dispositive here,
is not whether appellant has been damaged in any degree but
whether or not the type of damage it may have suffered is
compensable under the law. We suggest that appellant errs
when it assumes that all it need do to succeed is to show that
it sustained some damage. (State v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464,
120 P.2d 276; People v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451.)
Appellant's action is grounded on the theory that the
State has interfered with its "Rights of access, ingress, egress,
light, air and view and for the depreciation of its property
and subjecting plaintiff, its guests and business visitors to unreasonable and excessive noise, smoke and dust, and for loss
of plaintiff's business, and for changing grade on North
Temple Street in front of plaintiff's premises." (R. 97-102)
These items will be categorized and discussed below but it
should be observed that practically every case cited herein·
after is equally applicable on the broad question of each cate·
gory.
ACCESS, INGRESS, EGRESS
The State concedes that app_ellant has a right of reason·
able access to the highway system abutting its property, both
ingress and egress, for its own, as opposed to public use. Such
rights as appellant may thus have acquired in North Temple
Street are limited to reasonable access for itself and not unob·
structed access along its whole boundary with the street for
itself and the public generally. Hampton v. State Road Com·
mission, 21 U.2d 342, 445 P.2d 708; State v. Meier, supra;
Nichols on Eminent Domain, §5.72[1] at 115; City of Phoe·
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nix 11. Wade, 428 P.2d 450. To the extent that appellant's
access has been in any manner or degree interferred with,
the record before the lower court clearly justifies the conclusion of that court that it constitutes a reasonable exercise of
police power. Here, as in the case of Springville Banking Co. v.
Burton, supra, "access has not been denied. Interfered with,
it is true, bur ... to no unreasonable extent." (R. 143)
pellant may still move into and out of its properry from North
Temple Street and may utilize the system of public streets
provided. The erection of raised concrete dividers in our
highways, which have the effect of controlling access to abutting property owners without unreasonably interfering therewith, has been long recognized by this Court and other jurisdictions as a reasonable exercise of the police power for which
the abutters were not entitled to compensation. Springville
Banking Co. v. Burton, Hampton, v. State, supra; Nichols on
Eminent Domain, §5.72. In terms of access the erection of
the viaduct on North Temple Street is not substantially or
materially different than the erection of a raised divider. Indeed, on this point, the viaduct may be properly considered
to be a divider since the effect on access is identical.
The lower court has determined that there is no unreasonable interference with the appellant's access and that such
interference as has occurred is within the police power of the
State so to do. In this case such a finding was well within
the prerogative of the court and sustained by the evidence
adduced by appellant. In City of Phoenix v. Wade, supra, at
454, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
"Material impairment of access cannot be fixed
by abstract definition. It must be found in each case
upon the basis of the factual situation. While certain

5

rules have been set forth in various decisions whicli
have considered the nature and scope of this righ1
each case must be considered on its own right. Th!
determination of whether such material impairment
has been established must be reached as a matter o/
law. The extent of such impairment must be fixed
as a matter of fact. The trial court must rule as a
matter of law whether the interference of access constitutes a destruction or material impairment." (Em.
phasis added.)
Appellant was permitted to and did present all of the evi·
dence before the lower court which it deemed desirable (R
149). Through the State's chief structural engineer, appel·
lant elicited the facts as to the existing and contemplated ac·
cess to its property after construction of the viaduct. The
court was fully informed, therefore, as to the facts and thus
properly ruled as a matter of law that the proposed construe·
tion did not constitute a destruction or material impairment
to appellant's access and that the interference therewith con·
stituted a valid exercise of police power.
CHANGE OF GRADE, LOSS OF BUSINESS,
DEPRECIATION
The record establishes that in order to claim a "change
of grade" as appellant seeks to do here, it must ignore the
17Y2 + right of way remaining in front of its property on
North Temple Street, and assume that the viaduct structure
is built directly on its property line. This flies in the face of
the record (R. 135).
The evidence adduced on behalf of appellant in the court
below shows that there will not be (and in fact there is not)
a substantial change in grade as to North Temple Street from
appellant's property (R. 131). On the contrary, while it is

6

contemplated that the curb lines will be moved back to the
existing sidewalk line, the location of the sidewalk remains
the same (R. 130-131). It follows, therefore, that except
as to the viaduct to which appellant has never acquired any
direct right of access, there has been no change of grade. In
Troumo v. Colorado Department of Highways, Colo. 463 P.2d
448, the same conditions essentially existed. In that case Mrs.
Troiano sought damages because of the construction of the viaduct over the street abutting her property. The nature of the
damages for which she sought to recover were substantially
identical with those claimed in this proceeding. We respectfully
suggest that the opinion enunciated in that case by the Colorado Supreme Court is highly persuasive on the issues raised
in this case because it is made on very nearly identical facts.
Mrs. Troiano asserted some claims for relief which are not
included by appellant in this case. At page 451, the Colorado court said:

"* * * In states which have decided this issue
not provided for by specific legislation, the authorities
hold that where access to an abutting road remains
essentially unimpaired, the building of a viaduct over
the road does not constitute a compensable change of
grade. ( Citing cases) "
Colorado concluded that the building of a viaduct and
roadway did not constitute a change in grade and cited with
approval a Missouri case, Kansas City v. Berkshire Lumber Co.,
393 S.W.2d 470, where it is stated at 474:

"* * * Appellant retains its previously existing
right of access to previously established Truman Road
and in turn to the city's streets and highway system.
The legal status of such right has in no way been
altered by the erection of the viaduct. Admittedly
7

appellant does not have direct access from its propercy
to the viaduct roadway. However, the viaduct roadway
does not actually abut appellant's property and appeJ.
lant never did have any right of direct access to such
roadway."
After discussing other authorities, the Colorado court
eluded at 452:

COO·

"In our view the elevated portion of I-70 coo.
stitutes a new highway on a new location to which
Mrs. Troiano has no existing or after acquired property
rights. Plaintiff's property abuts East 46th Avenue,
and there has been no significant change in the grade
of East 46th Avenue causing plaintiff impairment of
access to her property."

With reference to the allegation of loss of business, it
should be sufficient to observe that appellant presented no evi·
dence whatsoever to support such a claim. However, for sake
of argument, if it be considered that appellant may have been
able to establish such a loss, it remains a non-compensable
item under the well established law of this and other jurisdic·
tions. State v. Parker, State v. Meier, supra. It is too well settled
to require extensive citation that abutting owners do not have
and cannot acquire property rights to the traffic passing in
front of their premises. Nevertheless it is worthy of note that
in a real attempt to limit the loss to appellant and other land
owners in the vicinity, the State has at some substantial ex·
pense after public hearing designed and built an off-ramp directly to the corner of appellant's property. (R. 142-143). In
an equity proceeding such as this, the good faith efforts of the
State to limit non-compensable damage is pertinent and signifi·
cant.

8

Generally, on the question of loss of business, as well as
the other claimed elements of damage by appellant, the Arizona case of Rayburn v. State, 3 7 8 P.2d 496, contains well reasoned and compelling language demonstrating why such loss
is not recoverable in an action such as this. Therein the court
stated at 498:
"* * * The cases are virtually unanimous in
holding that an owner is not entitled to compensation
when the traffic flow on an abutting street is converted
from two-way traffic to one-way only, * * *;or when
a traffic divider or island is constructed on the abutting
street, * * * ."
After observing that the cases cited by appellant were not in
point, the Arizona court went on to say, quoting initially from
other cases, at 499:
" ' "The benefits which come and go from the
changing currents of travel are not matters in respect
to which any individual has any vested right against
the judgment of the public authorities." If the public
authorities could never change a street or highway
without paying all persons along such thoroughfares
for their loss of business, the cost would be prohibitive.
The highways primarily are for the benefit of the
traveling public, and are only incidentally for the benefit of those who are engaged in business along its way.
They build up their businesses knowing that new roads
may be built that will largely take away the traveling
public. This is a risk they must necessarily asswne.' "
The cases cited elsewhere in this brief are equally determinative of the issue of depreciation of property. The Supreme
Court of Colorado in Troiano v. Colorado Highway Department, supra, at 45 3 and 454, considered the matter and after
observing that: "This factor is hardly separable from circuity
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of route," quoted from a New Mexico case, Board of Count)
Comrs. of Santa Fe County v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 15!
P.2d 859:
"* * * obviously, the landowner's claim must
rest or fall upon a decision whether she has a vested
right in the flow of public travel, which once came bi
her door, but for which now, for the convenience of the
general public, a shorter and more convenient route
has been opened and is being employed. We hold she
has no such right."
To urge that in a situation such as this an abutting owner
is entitled to recover for depreciation of property is to assert
that the State may be and is estopped from making any im·
provement of a public right of way without the consent of the
abutters. No citation of law is necessary to establish the long
and firmly held rule that estoppel will not lie as against the
sovereign.
LIGHT, AIR AND VIEW
This Court has consistently held that interference with
light, air, etc., was not compensable, where, as here, there was
no physical invasion upon the land of the property owner.
State v. Parker, 13 U.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585, and cases cited
therein. The rationale for this holding is well enunciated in
Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So.2d 865, and quoted at
length in Nichols on Emiment Domain, § 5.72 at 166:
"The owner of property abutting a public way has
a right of ingress to and egress from his property as
well as a right to enjoy the view therefrom. However,
these are rights which are subordinate to the underlying
right of the public to enjoy the public way to its fullest
extent as well as the right of the public to have the
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way improved to meet the demands of public convenience and necessity. If the improvement for the benefit of the public interferes with the pre-existing means
of ingress and egress and view enjoyed by the individual property owner, without an actual physical invasion of the land of the property owner, then again
we have a situation where the invidual right is subordinate to the public good and any alleged damage
suffered is damnum absque injuria. This is so for the
simple reason that one who acquires property abutting
a public way acquires it subject and subordinate to the
right of the public to have the way improved to meet
the public need."
At page 15 3 of the cited reference, Nichols says:
"As a right to light and air from adjoining premises can arise in this country only from actual grant, in
the absence of a grant compensation based on the existence of such a right cannot be recovered."
Justice Henriod, in State v. Parker, supra, in referring to
the same type of alleged damages, stated: "On numerous occasions we have held that such damage is not recoverable because of the State's immunity." Appellant has conceded that
on the question at issue, the State has not waived its immunity.
(R. 117). In view of the consistent and insistent dissents of
Justice Wade on the issue of sovereign immunity, it is particularly significant, we suggest, that the Legislature did not see
fit to alter the historical and well established sovereign immunity of the State in these particulars when it subsequently
enacted what is now known as the Governmental Immunity

Act.
We have heretofore referred to the decision of our neighboring state of Colorado in the recent ( 1970) case of Troiano
v. Colorado Department of Highways, supra. We suggest that
11

this case is and should be highly persuasive on the issues raisea
herein because it is made on very nearly identical facts. Prac
tically every element of damage claimed by the appellant here.
in was alleged and urged by Mrs. Troiano (see page 450 of
cited case) . The Colorado court discussed the various
of damage which is detailed and noted at page 449:
"The trial court held that the damages claimed bi
plaintiff were non-compensable. The court ruled the
highway construction was a valid exercise of the police
power and that the claimed damage was not different
in kind from that suffered by the general public. In
our view the judgment of the trial court should be af·
firmed."
On the issue of loss of view, the Colorado court said at
page 455:
"One other claimed special and unique damage is
the loss of view. There are two types of view with re·
gard to the motel property. One is the view from the
highway looking toward the property. Mrs. Troiano
has complained that the traveling public on 1-70 can
no longer see her motel since it is below the viaduct.
With the majority view holding that a property owner
has no right to have the traveling public pass his property, logically it would be inconsistent to say that a
property owner has a right to have the traveling public,
afforded a clear view of his property.

1

"The other kind of loss of view - loss of view ,
from the property caused by the construction of this
viaduct, also is not compensable. * * * In the same I
category is the claim for damage because of the loss o!
light, air and ventilation. Most courts, in similar cases,
hold that any loss attributable to these items consci·
tute general damages and not specific damages."
1

1
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In People v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, wherein the appellants sought to recover for damages arising from, among other
things, "change in neighborhood (from quiet residential area),
Joss of privacy, loss of view, noise, fumes, and dust from freeway, loss of access over area occupied by freeway,
" The
Supreme Court of California observed, at 454:
"* * * It is manifest, then, that the crucial
question here is whether the defendants, whose property was taken for purposes other than the construction
of the freeway itself, are entitled to compensation, as
severance damages, for those impediments to the property resulting from the objectionable features caused
by the maintenance and operation of the freeway
proper on lands other than those taken from the defendants."
That court answers the "crucial question" by stating:
"It is established that when a public improvement
is made on property adjoining that of one who claims
to be damaged by such general factors as change of
neighborhood, noise, dust, change of view, diminished
access and other factors similar to the damages claimed
in the instant case, there can be no recovery where
there has been no actual taking or severance of the
claimant's property."
As to appellant's claim to a right to recover damages
from the State, in the instant case, for interference with its
light, air and view, it is apparent that it seeks to burden the
State with liability in excess of that which it may hope to impose on private abutting owners. Within the scope of zoning
ordinances, appellant's private neighbors could lawfully erect
skyscrapers or unsightly (in the subjective view) buildings
which would have the effect of adversely affecting appellant's

13

light, air and view without hope of compensation. Is it serious!;
to be contemplated that our constitutional drafters or our legi;
lators actually intended such an anomaly? We respectfulh
submit that to pose the question is to answer it.
California, in State v. Symons, supra, addressed itself to
this question when it stated, at 455:
"* * * The Courts have not authorized a re
covery under article I, section 14 of our state Consti
tution where there would be no recovery for damages
caused by the construction of an improvement if under·
taken by a private citizen on adjoining property. * * 1
Yet, the defendants seek to accomplish just that in the
instant case. To thus enlarge the scope of the state'1
liability under article I, section 14 would impose a
severe burden on the public treasury and, in effect,
place an embargo upon the creation of new and de·
sirable roads."

As they relate to the issues before this Court, the constitutiom
of Colorado, California and Arizona are substantially identical
to our own, requiring compensation for property taken or damaged for a public use. (Colorado, Art. II, Sec. 15; California,
Art. I, Sec. 14; Arizona, Art. II, Sec. 17.)

If the appellant is entitled to recover for the consequential
damage which it alleges and urges before this Court, the abut·
ting property owners all along both sides of the viaduct are
without doubt entitled to recover also. Extending this to the
multiple improvements made annually by the Utah State Road
Commission and the State Highway Department, it is readily
discernible that the consequences foreseen by Justice Henriod
in Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, supra, at 159, must nat·

14

urally follow. "Highways would remam unmarked because
of the prohibitive cost involved in payment of damages to
owners on both sides, .
The respondents are not insensitive to the fact that mere
cost alone cannot and should not be determinative. Our law is
not ungenerous in providing for just compensation to those
whose property, as opposed to rights in property and to the
unobstructed enjoyment thereof (of necessity subject to the
public interest), is taken. Nevertheless, in order to accomplish
the greatest public good at the least private injury, the law and
the courts have properly and of necessity recognized that in
areas such as those now before this Court, no compensation
is or should be required. The language of the Court in Springville Banking Co. v. Burton is again appropriate, convincing
and, we respectfully suggest, the binding law of this jurisdiction
when it treats the question of compensability for the erection
of raised dividers as follows:
"In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield
to the common weal, albeit injury to their property
may result. We espouse the notion that if the sovereign
exercises its police power reasonably and for the good
of all the people, when constructing highways, consequential damages such as those alleged here, are not
compensable."

The quoted language from Springville Banking Co. case, we respectfully suggest, is applicable to all areas of damages claimed
by the appellant in this proceeding.
Appellant does not allege that the construction of the
viaduct is improperly programmed or in any manner a violation of the public interest. On the contrary, it admits that the
viaduct should and must be built (R. 154).
15

NOISE, SMOKE AND DUST
The case of Hurst v. Highway Department of the Stat.
of Utah, 16 U.2d 153, 397 P.2d 71, is dispositive of appellant'
claim for damages resulting from noise, smoke and dust. Ii
that case the issue involved the operation of a gravel pit neai
plaintiff's home in Orem, Utah. The trial court dismissed thi
Highway Department from the case. Justice Crockett, writin1
the prevailing opinion said:
"In regard to the argument that the trial court'!
action permits an arbitrary invasion of the
right to the enjoyment of their home without affordin1
them a remedy, it is to be observed that no one has ani
absolute rights, but they are all conditioned upon tht
rights of others. Everyone in a well-ordered society must
make some concessions of his individual rights and de
sires in deference to the common good and in recom
pense for all of the other rights and protections accord
ed him by the entire structure of law."
Upon the clear weight of authority, and consistent with
reasoned analysis, we respectfully suggest to the Court that
every single element of damage which appellant seeks to re·
cover in this proceeding has been heretofore, and should 0011
be finally, declared to be non-compensable in circumstancei
such as those existing in this case by reason of governmental
immunity and the valid exercise of the police power of the
State.

16
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THE DOOLY BLOCK CASE AND FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE INST ANT CASE
AND THE HOLDINGS IN THOSE CASES ARE
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT.
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Dooly Block v.
Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 ( 1893), in
support of its contention that it is entitled to recovery in the
instant case. It must be noted that the Dooly Block case dealt
with the proposed use of an established roadway for a purpose
inconsistent with its use as a roadway. The court in the Dooly
Block case stated:

"* * * The right of municipalities to grant franchises to private corporations for the construction and
operation of street railways, when empowered by the
legislature so to do, is not now, it seems, an open question, although streets were originally not designed for
that purpose, but were mostly confined to the right of
public travel in the ordinary modes." (Emphasis added.) 9 Utah at 38, 39.
It is clear from the facts of the above cited cases that
the proposed use in that case was for the construction of a nonhighway related facility, to wit: A double-track railroad and
its appurtenances and that said facility was constructed and
operated by a private corporation. Respondents take the position that the State may alter the existing roadway, when it
does so to facilitate its use as a roadway, without incurring
liability for damages which may result from such alterations as
long as it does not unreasonably impair an established right of
the abutting owners resulting in a legally compensable damage
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said owners, although the same or similar alteration for non.
highway use may result in a compensable damage to abutting
owners. Since the Dooly Block case involves alteration for a
non-highway related use by a private corporation, it is respond.
ents' contention that this case is not in point in the instant case.
to

This position was taken by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Louisa Sauer v. City of New York, 206
U.S. 536, 27 S.Ct. 686, 51 L.Ed. 1170 ( 1907). In interpreting the case of Story v. Railway Co., 98 N.Y. 122, 43 Am. Rep.
146 (1882), a case which was relied on in the Dooly Block
case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

"* * * The decision [in the Story case} rested
upon the view that the erection of an elevated structure
for railroad purposes was not a legitimate street use.
'There is no change,' said Judge Danforth (p. 156),
'in the street surface intended; but the elevation of a
structure useless for general street purposes, . . .
"'The question here presented,' said Judge Tracy
( p. 174, Am. Rep. p. 15 6) , 'is not whether the legis·
lature has the power to regulate and control the public
uses of the public streets of the city, but whether it has
the power to grant to a railroad corporation authority
to take possession of such streets and appropriate them
to uses inconsistent with and destructive of their con·
tinued use as open public streets of the city.'"
206 U.S. at 550.

The U.S. Supreme Court then found in the Sauer case:

"* * * The difference between a structure erect·
ed for the exclusive use of a railroad and one erected
for the general use of the public was sharply defined
[in cases interpreting the Story and related cases}. Ir
was only the former which the court had in view. That
the structure was elevated, and for that reason affected
access, light, and air, was an important element in the
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decisions, but it was not the only essential element. The
structures in these cases were held to violate the landowners' rights, not only because they were elevated and
thereby obstructed access, light, and air, but also because they were designed for the exclusive and permanent use of private corporations."
206 U.S. at 552.
The court then went on to find that when streets are improved
for purposes necessary for continued use as streets and related
uses and such improvements result in a restriction of an abutting owner's rights to access, light, and air, the cases involving
improvements for railroad and other non-railroad purposes
would not apply. To support this proposition, the court cited
the case of Talbot v. New York & H. R. Co., 151 N.Y. 155,
45 N.E. 382, a case which held that an abutting property owner
could not recover damages resulting from the construction of
a public bridge.
"* * * with inclined approaches and a guard
wall, to carry travel over a railroad, although the structure impaired the access to his land."
206 U.S. at 554.
It is respondents' contention that the same distinction
made by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Sauer case between
that case and the Story case clearly applies in distinguishing
the instant case and the Dooly Block case. In the Dooly Block
case as in the Story case the improvement in the roadway which
impaired the property owner's rights was a private railroad
improvement and its appurtenances. Iri the instant case the improvement is a viaduct used to carry motor vehicles safely along
a portion of the existing road system. The State is updating
a portion of its roadway system, not to have it subverted to
some other use inconsistent with highway travel but to facili-
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tate safer and more free movement of motor vehicle travel or
that portion of the roadway. This clearly is not only a US>
consistent with the proposed use of the roadway but one whid
is desirable and necessary, nor is the improvement for the USt
of a private corporation or company but for the use and benefo
of the public.
Appellant has stated that the lower court, by dismissini
its Complaint, overruled the case of State v. Fourth Judicial
District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 ( 1938) (App. Brief,
p. 6). It is important to note that although appellant allege1
that the Fourth District Court case is "identical on the facts tc
plaintiff's case," (App. Brief, p. 6), such is not the case. In tht
Fourth Judicial District Court case it was alleged that the con·
struction by the State would:
1. "darken and dampen the street m front of plain·
tiff's properties;"
2. "prevent continuous travel on Center street past
the properties of the plaintiffs, except over the
proposed viaduct."

3. "that the interurban railway tracks now located in

the middle of the street will be moved 22.2 feet
north to a line in close proximity to plaintiffs'
properties."
94 Utah at 388.
In the instant case it is inconceivable that the structure
constructed by the State will "darken or dampen plaintim
property" since, as the court can take judicial notice of, the
sun in this area of the country is almost always to the south
and east or west, depending on the time of day, and the srruc
ture in question is to the north of appellant's property. It
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would be unlikely that any darkening of appellant's property
could result from the State's construction. The appellant has
not alleged that it will dampen its property.
The appellant in the instant case will have "continuous
travel" on the portion of North Temple directly in front of its
property, which, after the taking, will remain a one-way rightof-way 17 feet in width. (R 135, 136).
In the instant case no railway tracks will be relocated
closer to appellant's property. If this were the case, the rule
laid down in the Dooly Block case might apply.
The Fourth Judicial District Court case is not only distinguishable on its facts but there are also other important distinctions to be made between that case and the instant case
which render it inapplicable in deciding the case at bar. First to
be noted is that most of the opinion in the Fourth Judicial District Court case is dicta. The holding of the case is that an injunction will not lie against the State Road Commission.
Secondly, it is to be noted that in the Fourth Judicial
District Court case there is no indication that a hearing was
held and evidence adduced to determine whether or not the
construction by the State would give rise to a compensable
damage. In the instant case appellant was afforded the opportunity to put on any and all evidence it deemed necessary in an
attempt to show there would be a compensable damage resulting from the proposed construction by the State. There
was testimony taken and exhibits admitted into evidence and a
scale model of the proposed structure made available for the
lower court to examine (R. 129-148).
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Thirdly, the finding of the lower court was that no com.
pensable injury resulted from the proposed construction by the
State ( R. 17). Respondents respectfully submit that nowhere in
the Fourth Judicial District Court case does it hold that in all
cases where there is an impairment of access, light, air, and
view, an abutting property owner is entitled to compensation
for damages which may result.
Fourth, subsequent cases and at least one law review
article dealing with the Fourth District Court case have either
overruled the rationale expressed in the dicta of that case or
expressed an opinion that the ruling no longer would apply.
(See Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 901
(1952); Robert S. Campbell, Jr., The Limited Access Highway
- Some Aspects of Compensation, 8 Utah 1. Rev. 12 ( 1962).
For the above stated reasons it is respectfully submitted
to this Court that the two cases relied on by appellant (Dool)
Block and Fourth Judicial District Court) are not controlling
nor even persuasive in deciding the instant case.
POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR TRESPASSING IN CONNECTION
WITH THIS PROCEEDING.
The State does not argue that it may trespass upon the
private property of its residents with impunity. Indeed, the
respondents may, in a proper case, be accountable for damage)
for trespass as may any other entity. However, in respect to thi)
action, there is no such "proper case."
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It should first be observed that the dismissal of the Sup-

plemental Complaint was sought by the appellant for the obvious purpose of expediting this appeal, and, it is asserted, to acquire, hopefully, some psychological advantage in its principal
case ( R. 9-10) . The original order of dismissal prepared by
the appellant sought to dismiss the Supplemental Complaint
although the court specifically reserved the action for trespass
in notifying the parties that it was otherwise granting the respondents' motion to dismiss (R. 19-21). In order to comply
with the notification of the court, counsel prepared and submitted the amended order (R. 15-18) specifically reserving
the action alleged in the Supplemental Complaint and setting a
date for submission of an Answer or other pleading by the
State and the contractor-defendant. Within the time so specified, each party defendant pleaded to the Supplemental Complaint and thereafter plaintiff-appellant drafted and filed its
consent to proceed without further notice. ( R. 9-10). Appellant should riot be heard to complain of its success. In any
event, the dismissal was proper because the appellant was in
possession of the premises upon which trespass was alleged
only by tenant and not in person. Damages, if any, resulting
were payable to the tenant in possession and not to the appellant.
Certainly, the tenant in possession was an indispensable
party and the appellant was not entitled to relief which it may
subsequently be determined properly belonged to the tenant.
It is conceded that the record does not reflect directly that the
State's allegations concerning tenant in possession is correct.
However, the conduct of the appellant in seeking ruling with-
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out argument must be taken as a concession on this point
Certainly, the appellant has not denied this allegation and re
spondents have asserted it as a fact.
The State has sought to determine what, if any, damages
accrued to the appellant and/or his tenant in possession at the
time of the alleged trespass. Counsel for the appellant has been
advised that the State was (and in fact it remains) prepared to
reach an accord on this matter by a minimal showing by the
appellant. In any event, there is no basis in law or in
for consideration of the Supplemental Complaint in connection
with the remainder of this proceeding. Respondents resped·
fully urge that the question of the Supplemental Complaint
should be considered apart from the main thrust of appellant'1
action.

CONCLUSION
The issuance of the injunctive relief sought by the appel·
lant would have been improper under the developed law ol
this jurisdiction because the alleged damages sought to be re
covered by the appellant are clearly non-compensable as a re·
sult of the reasonable and valid exercise of the police power
The facts of this case do not justify recovery even under the
law of the several authorities cited by appellant, since the fadl
in those cases are clearly distinguishable.
The lower court permitted the appellant to present all
the evidence it deemed desirable. After a thorough review ol
the authorities cited by the respective parties, and a full con
sideration of the evidence presented, the court granted the de
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fendants' motion to dismiss. The judgment of the lower court
is, we respectfully submit, entitled to due deference by this
honorable court under well established rules of review.
It is respectfully suggested that the law of the State on
rhe matter now before this Court is too well established and
settled to afford any basis for the relief sought by the appellant and the judgment of the lower court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
MARK A. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
DONALDS. COLEMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
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